Signal-Power Corruption Networks
Interactive analysis of spyware, telecom signalling risks, data-broker exposure, and platform governance in Aotearoa New Zealand β plus immediate levers aligned to NZ law.
π― Targeted Device Access & Vendor Supply
Targeted on-device access and lawful intercept authorities create procurement channels for mercenary and domestic tooling. Oversight needs to match vendor capabilities and cross-border data flows.
π‘ Telecom Signalling Exploits (SS7/Diameter/Roaming)
Roaming and interconnect layers can be abused for location tracking and message interception. Mitigations are uneven; coordinated audits and operator attestations are essential.
π± Cell-Site Simulators (IMSI-catchers)
Procurement and deployment by law-enforcement bodies is opaque. Risks include dragnet capture and retention of bystander identifiers without clear purge standards.
ποΈ Data-Broker & Adtech Exposure
Retail, app-SDK, and adtech flows can reveal sensitive locations and behavioural profiles. Key risks: consent defects, opaque downstream use, and cross-border disclosures.
πΊ Platform Governance & Online Safety
Platform obligations for illegal/harmful content and transparency are evolving. Public logging of government requests and user-facing appeal paths reduce βinformal pressureβ risk.
πΈοΈ Corruption Network Visualization (New Zealand)
Relationships between spyware vendors, data brokers, telecoms, platforms, and NZ authorities. Drag nodes to explore.
π Key Relationships (NZ)
Investigatory powers β vendor ecosystem
Core: Targeted device/network access β mercenary/domestic tools β procurement oversight & NDA constraints.
Telecom signalling & roaming
Core: SS7/Diameter interconnect β global-title and roaming exposure β carrier mitigations & audits.
Data-broker β platform loop
Flow: Apps/SDKs/Retail β aggregators β adtech & public buyers; consent/disclosure compliance monitored by regulators.
π Signal-Power Evolution Timeline (New Zealand)
Foundational intercept & metadata regimes
Carrier and agency obligations establish baseline access and retention expectations; oversight bodies refine codes over time.
Targeted device access & technical notices
Computer-access warrants and capability notices enable on-device actions under judicial/ministerial control.
Platform governance & online-safety frameworks
Codes/standards for harm reduction and transparency; dispute-resolution and appeals mature.
Signal-layer scrutiny & roaming risk
Interconnect audits and incident reporting expand; cross-border exploitation prompts coordinated responses.
β‘ Immediate Stop-Gap Actions (NZ-aligned)
Drafted to dovetail with NZ investigatory-powers and privacy regimes while constraining βsignal-powerβ abuse.
π‘οΈ Spyware/High-Risk Tools
- Judicial authorization + necessity/proportionality for invasive tools (ODIT/spyware).
- Public DPIA within 30 days of program start; quarterly aggregate reporting (vendor, legal basis, categories).
- Vendor NDAs unenforceable against courts, independent oversight, and privacy regulators.
π‘ Signalling/Interconnect Hardening
- Carrier attestations on SS7/Diameter defences and roaming-edge audits; annual third-party testing with public summaries.
- Incident statistics and corrective action logs; publishable without compromising active ops.
ποΈ Data-Broker Containment
- No acquisition of location/behavioural datasets absent lawful basis and minimization plan.
- Public broker relationship log; deletion audits; direct-marketing conformance under privacy/telecom rules.
π± IMSI-catcher Governance
- Warrant standard; purge attestations for non-targets; capability summaries and annual oversight review.
πΊ Platform Governance
- Documented systemic-risk logs; βno informal pressureβ policy with auditable legal bases for requests.
- Child-safety design and transparency measures per online-safety regimes.
π Implementation Toolkit (Model Resolution / By-law)
Edit inline; then copy or download. Language aligns with NZ frameworks and telecom/online-safety contexts.