Signal-Power Corruption Networks
Interactive analysis of spyware, telecom signalling risks, data-broker exposure, and platform governance in Australia β plus immediate levers aligned to AU law.
π― On-Device & Lawful Access Capabilities
Australiaβs investigatory powers framework enables targeted device access and network disruption powers under exceptional warrants. Civil-liberties groups argue oversight must keep pace with vendor capabilities and cross-border procurement.
π‘ Telecom Signalling Exploits (SS7/Diameter/Roaming)
Roaming and interconnect layers can be abused for location tracking and message interception. Mitigations are uneven; coordinated audits and operator attestations are essential.
π± Cell-Site Simulators (IMSI-catchers)
Use by law-enforcement bodies has been reported, with procurement often shielded. Risks include dragnet capture and retention of bystander identifiers.
ποΈ Data-Broker & Adtech Exposure
Retail, app-SDK, and adtech flows can reveal sensitive locations and behavioural profiles. Regulatory findings highlight consent defects and opaque downstream use.
πΊ Platform Governance & Online Safety
Online-safety and misinformation regimes impose duties on platforms. Transparency around government requests and algorithmic curation remains necessary to limit informal pressure.
πΈοΈ Corruption Network Visualization (Australia)
Relationships between spyware vendors, data brokers, telecoms, platforms, and AU authorities. Drag nodes to explore.
π Key Relationships (AU)
Investigatory powers β vendor ecosystem
Core: Targeted device/network access β mercenary/domestic tools β procurement oversight & NDA constraints.
Telecom signalling & roaming
Core: SS7/Diameter interconnect β global-title and roaming exposure β carrier mitigations & audits.
Data-broker β platform loop
Flow: Apps/SDKs/Retail β aggregators β adtech & public buyers; consent/disclosure compliance monitored by regulators.
π Signal-Power Evolution Timeline (Australia)
Metadata & interception regimes
Retention and interception frameworks establish baseline access powers across agencies and carriers.
Assistance & access powers
Targeted computer-access and technical-assistance mechanisms created; debate on encryption and systemic risk intensifies.
Platform governance & online safety
Codes, standards, and regulator guidance phase in; transparency and due-process measures contested.
Signal-layer scrutiny
Roaming/interconnect audits and incident reporting expand; cross-border abuse becomes a focus.
β‘ Immediate Stop-Gap Actions (AU-aligned)
Drafted to dovetail with AU investigatory-powers and privacy regimes while constraining βsignal-powerβ abuse.
π‘οΈ Spyware/High-Risk Tools
- Judicial authorization + necessity/proportionality for invasive tools (ODIT/spyware).
- Public DPIA within 30 days of program start; quarterly aggregate reporting (vendor, legal basis, categories).
- Vendor NDAs unenforceable against courts, inspectors-general, and privacy regulators.
π‘ Signalling/Interconnect Hardening
- Carrier attestations on SS7/Diameter defences and roaming-edge audits; annual third-party testing with public summaries.
- Incident statistics and corrective action logs; publishable without compromising active ops.
ποΈ Data-Broker Containment
- No acquisition of location/behavioural datasets absent lawful basis and minimization plan.
- Public broker relationship log; deletion audits; direct-marketing conformance under privacy/telecom rules.
π± IMSI-catcher Governance
- Warrant standard; purge attestations for non-targets; capability summaries and annual oversight review.
πΊ Platform Governance
- Documented systemic-risk logs; βno informal pressureβ policy with auditable legal bases for requests.
- Child-safety design and transparency measures per online-safety regimes.
π Implementation Toolkit (Model Resolution / By-law)
Edit inline; then copy or download. Language aligns with AU frameworks and telecom/online-safety contexts.